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ESSAY

Tapping "Rainy Day" Funds
for the Reluctant Entrepreneur:
Downsizing, Paternalism, and
the Internal Revenue Code*
BY EDWARD J. GAC**
& WAYNE M. GAZUR***

"He who risks nothing can gain nothing."
ItalianProverb
"A fool and his money are soon parted."
English Proverb
INTRODUCTION

T

wo recent and seemingly unrelated trends converge to form the
basis of this essay First, business downsizing and the concomi-
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tant discharge of white-collar middle-management employees has become
a frequently reported occurrence.' Second, this downsizing has taken
place when the overall amount of wealth accumulated m employee
pension, profit-sharing, 401(k), and other retirement plans has
reached record levels. 2 Many of the displaced employees will find other
' See, e.g., Rosalie Robles Crowe, White-Collar Workers Get Boot as
America Downszzes, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Sept. 24, 1993, at D1 (reporting that
from June 1992 to June 1993, white-collar salaned positions accounted for 55%
of all jobs eliminated); Claudia Feldman, The White-Collar UnemployedBlues:
Support Groups Help FacilitateJob Search, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 19, 1993, at
1 (discussing a local dislocated worker program which helps more than 2000
clients annually; at least 50% of those seeking help are professionals and
managers); Stephen Franklin, '91 Unfolds As a Record Layoff Year, CHi. TRm.,
Sept. 21, 1991, at 1 ("[C]orporate downsizing - the laying off of thousands of
workers, most of them white-collar - has become the medicine of choice for
hundreds of corporations."); David Hage & Sara Collins, Reaching Out For
Help, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 23, 1992, at 67 ("Two years of weak
growth have thrown 1.1 million white-collar Americans out of work - a toll that
exceeds blue-collar layoffs for the first time in any post-war recession."); Earle
Hitchner, White CollarBlues: Management Loyalties in an Age of Corporate
Restructuring,NAT'L PRODUCTIVITY REv., Sept. 1, 1995, at 133 (book review)
("For the past seven years, middle management has fallen under the knife of
corporate cuts as never before."); Tom Mashberg, Massachusetts Middle
Managers Cope With Job Loss, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 14, 1996, at 22 ("What
began as a campaign by big business to go 'lean and mean' on the factory floor
has bubbled over with a vengeance into the ranks of the once 'untouchables' career white-collar middle managers."); Shannon Mullen, Few Statistics
Available to Measure Severity ofLayoffs, ASBURY PARK PRESS, May 12, 1996,
at A17; Knsti Wright, Victims of the Times, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Apr. 2,
1996, at 31SF ("Some of Omaha's largest companies, such as Umon Pacific
Corp., U.S. West Communications, and AT&T, have dismissed employees m
recent years. The last major cutback came last month when Mutual of Omaha
announced it would eliminate 800 positions by year end.").
2 The assets of private pension funds increased from $676 billion in 1980
to $3.48 trillion in 1994. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS (Mar. 1995), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF COM.,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 535, No. 834 (115th
ed. 1995). While the total number of plans has increased from 488,900 in 1980
to 699,300 in 1991, the number has dropped from a high of 712,300 in 1990. See
U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., PRIVATE PENSION BULLETIN (Summer 1993), reprintedin
U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

1995,

at

383, No. 599 (115th ed. 1995). Defined benefit plans have declined from
148,100 m 1980 to 101,800 in 1991, while defined contribution plans have seen
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work,3 and some will enter early retirement. Among their ranks,
however, there are those who will seize the opportunity to explore
entrepreneurial options.4 An important ingredient for their success is, of
course, the availability of capital.
One potential source of capital is qualified retirement plans. This
essay explores the income tax restrictions nposed on employee preretirement access to qualified retirement plan assets and the policies
implicit in those rules. It concludes with a discussion of the desirability

an increase from 340,800 in 1980 to 597,500 in 1991. See id. This trend may
reflect employer flight from the complexities and restrictiveness of defined
benefit plans. See John S. Nolan, The Merit of an Income Tax Versus a
Consumption Tax, 12 AM. J. OF TAx POL'Y 207, 214 (1995) ("It is regrettable
that we have made the rules governing defined benefit pension plans so onerous
and complex that employers and employees have already moved heavily toward
defined contribution plans."); Susan J. Stabile, The 20th Anniversary of the
EmployeeRetirementIncome SecurityAct (1974-1994): ConcludingRemarks, 68
ST. JOHN'S L. REv 481, 482 (1994).
3 A 1994 survey asked workers what they would do if they were laid off.
Forty-nine percent of the workers expectedto look for smilar positions. Fourteen
percent would take time off temporarily to relax and think. Thirteen percent
would start their own businesses. Nine percent would look for jobs in a different
field. Seven percent would return to school, four percent would retire, and four
percent were unsure or did not answer. See Workers Would Seek Same Job In
Layoff, Poll Finds, DAILY LAB. REP., Sept. 8, 1994.
4 See, e.g., MANAGING OFFICE TECH., Jan. 1, 1994, at 68 (documenting that

8 of 10 new entrepreneurs are over the age of 40); RIE. Coleberd, The Business
Economist at Work: The EconomistAs Entrepreneur,Bus. ECON., Oct. 1994, at
54; Randall Lane, Involuntary Entrepreneurs, FORBES, June 3, 1996, at 81
(describing how corporate downsizing directly influenced growth of cutting-edge
entrepreneunalventures in North Carolina's ResearchTriangle); Sheila M. Poole,
Facingthe Future: Working - Some Choose to be Boss, Not Bossed, ATLANTA
J. & CoNST., Feb. 13, 1994, § R, at 7; Self-Employment Rises Among Downsized; Growth Reflects Emergence of "Gotta Be's," PR NEwsWIRE, May 31,
1996. The purchase of business franchises is reportedly a popular option. See,
e.g., Dropouts Drop In, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 8, 1991, at B1, Duke Ratliff,

Grow Biz: A Recycling Retailer,DISCOUNT MERCHANDISER, May 1996, at 92;
Mary Rowland, Your Own Account: Buying Your Own Franchise,N.Y TIMEs,
Mar. 10, 1991, § 3, at 14. One of the authors of this essay recently sat on an
airplane beside a former middle manager with more than 15 years of experience
at a large pharmaceutical company. He took a severance package and opened a
"Mailboxes etc." franchse.
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of modifications to such rules to support easier movement from a
workplace to self-employment.

I. THE ENTREPRENEURIAL CLIMATE PRODUCED BY DOWNSIZING
Until the early 1980s, the typical employee subject to layoffs and
downsizing was a blue-collar worker.' The "new" downsizing candidate,
however, can be a white-collar employee without a collective bargaining
agreement, often a middle-manager, who has provided significant past
services to the company 6
While many of these displaced employees seek employment with
other employers, the education and experience levels of some, whitecollar and blue-collar alike, them will cause them to strike out on their
own. When this happens, raising capital for the new enterprise is a
concern. Family, friends, the family home, and even credit cards are
typical sources of entrepreneurial seed capital.7 Other potential sources
are retirement plans, including pension, profit-sharing, 401(k), and
individual retirement accounts ("IRAs"). Although these retirement assets
are often highly liquid and do not present some of the difficulties of the
other alternatives, the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"), which is
inextricably linked with the policies of the Employee Retirement Income

' The reports are mixed. On the one hand, anecdotal data such as the
experience of the Chicago Federation .of Labor suggests that labor union
memberslp has not been affected by the downsizing that has targeted whitecollar middle managers. See Leon Pitt, ChicagoFederationofLaborTurns 100,
Cm. SUN-TIIvES, May 17, 1996, at 16. On the other hand, blue-collar workers
are still dismissed from their jobs at a higher rate than white-collar workers. See
Mane Cocco, Aunt Mane and the Myths About Downsizing, NEWSDAY (New
York), Apr. 25, 1996, at A61. Moreover, the wage gap between blue-collar and
white-collar workers appears to be widening. See John Yemma, Populist Pitch
on WorkerlnsecurityHitsHome With the Lesser-Educated,BoSTON GLOBE, Feb.
29, 1996, at 1.
6 See supra note 1.
7 See, e.g., ERIC A. SIEGEL ET AL., THE ERNST & YOUNG BUSINESS PLAN
GUIDE 26 (2d ed. 1993); Jan Alexander, Best Ways to Start a Business Now,
MONEY, Jan. 1, 1996, at 100 ("Most cash-hungry entrepreneurs turn to family,
friends and credit cards as they learn firsthand that banks and investors are
looking for some type of trackrecord before they grant loans."); Mo Schumpeter,
The Unknown Entrepreneur;Step One: Seed Daze, FORBES (ASAP Supp.), Apr.
8, 1996, at 22; Mo Schumpeter, The Unknown Entrepreneur;Step Two: Funding
Up, FORBES (ASAP Supp.), June 3, 1996, at 22.
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Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 8 generally precludes recourse to these
sources or makes access very expensive in terms of taxes and penalties.
We first briefly describe some of the common retirement plans and
the accompanying restrictions on pre-refirement withdrawals. We then
evaluate the policies underlying such restrictions with a view toward
whether they can be modified to better serve the needs of displaced
workers. Finally, in connection with our proposal to improve access, we
assess the recently proposed American Family Tax Relief Act's provisions9 dealing with tax-free withdrawals from IRAs for business startups.
H.

THE RETIREMENT PLAN MENAGERIE

In the taxation of employee deferred compensation arrangements, the
great dividing line is whether a plan is "non-qualified" or "qualified."' 1
Non-qualified plans continue to play a significant rofe in compensation
planning, particularly for highly compensated employees. Unfortunately,
if the desired income tax result of no current income to the employee is
to be achieved, the employee often must assume some risk of the
employer's insolvency " The qualified plan, on the other hand, permits
8 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Internal
Revenue Code and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
9 See mnfra notes 110, 119-20, 122-24, 127-28, 131-32 and accompanying
text.
10 Qualified retirement plans are in turn generally divided into "defined
benefit" versus "defined contribution" plans. With the former, the employer
promises a target retirement benefit and then makes contributions that, with
earnings, will provide such benefits; tins obviously requires, among other factors,
good actuarial predictions. With the latter, on the other hand, the employer
promises only to contribute a certain amount to the plan, and the participants are
entitled to those contributions, plus investment earnings, plus forfeitures from
other participants who left the plan.
n Many executive compensation arrangements are structured as so-called
"rabbi trusts" in wich the employer sets aside compensation in a trust to which
the employer has no further access, but to which the employer's creditors have
access. The employee accepts the (hopefully) Improbable risk of employer
insolvency in exchange for income tax treatment that does not treat the funding
of the trust as constructive receipt or economic benefit income to the employee.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d
1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding deferred compensation plan was available to the
corporation's creditors and therefore benefits did not constitute gross income).
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the employer to claim a deduction at the time amounts are transferred 2
to the safety of a retirement trust that is not subject to the claims of the
employer's creditors. 3 Moreover, the employee is not taxed on the
employer contribution (or subsequent earnings thereon) 4 until the
amounts are withdrawn,15 presumably on retirement. Qualified status
turns upon compliance with a number of requirements, 6 including such
complex topics as participation, vesting, and funding. 7
See generallyRidgeley A. Scott, Rabbis and Other Top Hats: The GreatEscape,
43 CATH. U. L. REv 1 (1993). "Many employers think that the Rabbi Trust
option is the best compromise of tax attributes, operating expenses, coverage, and
protection." Id. at 4-5.
12 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(l)-(3) (1994). With a non-qualified
plan, the
employer receives a deduction only in the "taxable year in which an amount
attributable to the contribution is includable in the gross income of the
employee[s].
"Id. § 404(a)(5). Compare id. § 83(h) (prescribing a similar
rule of deductibility for property transferred m connection with performance of
services).
,"In specifying the requirements for qualification, the statute refers to "[a]
trust created or organized in the United States and forming part of a stock bonus,
pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his
employees or their beneficiaries.
" See id. § 401(a). The statute permits
certain custodial accounts, annuity contracts, and insurance contracts to also be
treated as qualified trusts. See id. § 401(f).
14 The pension trust itself is also exempt from income taxation. See id. §
501(a). There are some exceptions, including the tax on unrelated business
mcome, see id. §§ 511-15, and various penalty taxes, see, e.g., id. § 4971 (failure
to meet mininum funding standards) and § 4979 (excess contributions).
15 See id. § 402. Employer contributions are also exempt
from federal
employment taxes, see zd. § 3121(a)(5), and federal unemployment taxes, see id.
§ 3306(b)(5).
16 See, e.g., id. § 401.
17 See, e.g., id. §410 (minimum participation standards),
§ 411 (mimmum
vesting standards), and § 412 (mmnimum funding standards); see generally
MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFrr

PLANS §§ 7.6-.7, 7.9, 8.1-.5, 9.1, 9.6-.9 (stud. ed. 1997); JEFFREY D.
MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW" ERISA AND BEYOND vol. 1 & 2, §§

4.01-.07, 5.01-.03, 8.01-4 (17th ed. 1997); Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking
Retirement Income Policies:Nondiscrimination,Integration,and the Questfor
Worker Security,42 TAX L. REv 435,499(1987) ("The nondiscrimnationrules
regarding vesting have been vague, have lacked uniformity and have generated
uncertainty."); Regina T. Jefferson, DefinedBenefit Plan Funding: How Much
Is Too Much?, 44 CASE W RES. L. REv 1 (1993) (discussing funding
requirements, asset recovery and acceleratedfunding, and overfunding); Michael
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A "qualified retirement plan" expansively encompasses traditional
company pension plans, 401(k) plans, supplemental retirement annuities
purchased by or for the benefit of employees of tax-exempt or educational organizations,18 and lowly LRAs.i 9 On the employee's part, the
benign taxation scheme is disturbed if he or she receives an early
distribution from the "qualified retirement plan." On the occasion of an
early distribution, the Code prescribes regular taxation on the amount received, 20 plus imposes a ten percent penalty 21 Not only are outright
distributions penalized, but loans from the pledging of an interest in a
qualified plan are generally treated as distributions.' One must also

W Melton, Making the NondiscriminationRules of Tax-QualifiedRetirement
Plans More Effective, 71 B.U. L. REv 47 (1991) (discussing broad-based
retirement savings plans and potential alternatives); Robert Stevenson & Nancy
Koppelman, A Non-Specialists' Field Guide to Qualified and Non Qualified
Retirement PlansAfter Tax Reform, 69 MICH. Bus. J. 258 (1990) (noting the
ever-increasing complexity of the tax rules for retirement plans).
18 These plans are subject to I.R.C. § 403(b) and looselyresemble a cash-ordeferred arrangementbest exemplifiedby the "401 (k)" plan. See generallyDavid
A. Pratt, Very SeriousBusiness: Sense andNonsense UnderSection 403(b) ofthe
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 59 ALB. L. REv 1197, 1262-68 (1996)
(discussing distribution requirements). Since the 403(b) plan is utilized primarily
by non-profit organizations, we will not deal with it in the context of this essay
dealing with business downsizing.
"' The "qualified retirement plan" referred to n the 10% penalty provisions
of I.R.C. § 72(t) is defined in I.R.C. § 4974(c).
20 If the distribution qualifies as a "lump sum distribution" the distributee
may be eligible for special income tax treatment of the distribution. See id. §
402(d). However, the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-188, §§ 1401(a) and 1402, 110 Stat. 1787-90 (1996), generallyrepealedsuch
special treatment for tax years beginning after December 31, 1999, subject to
certain transitional rules. Amounts rolled over to another plan may be exempt
from tax. See I.R.C. § 402(c). Unless the distribution is paid directly to another
eligible retirementplan, however, the payor of the distribution from the plan may
be required to withhold 20% of the distribution. See id. § 3405(c).
21 See I.RLC. § 72(t).
' See id. § 72(p)(1)(B). As a general rule, with several exceptions, a
qualified plan must provide that the employee's benefits under the plan may not
be assigned, alienated, or subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution, or
other equitable process. See id. § 401(a)(13). The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
created a new exception to the general non-assignment rule, providing that an
offset may be made against a plan participant's accruedbenefit for amounts owed
by the participant for certain crimes or violations of ERISA. See Taxpayer Relief
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distinguish between restrictions on distributions that must be imposed by
the plan itself (as part of attaining qualified status) and restrictions
broadly imposed on most types of early distributions in the form of the
ten percent penalty tax. Of course, there are exceptions to these general
rules. Those exceptions sketch out the conflicting policy lines drawn by
Congress over years of incremental tinkering to encourage the creation of
retirement nest eggs but permit limted access to the funds.' The latest
round of tinkering in this ever-evolving area, the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997,24 opened several new avenues of pre-retirement access to IRA
fund s ." In the materials that follow, we present an overview of the
maze of restrictions on access.
A.

GeneralPension and Profit-ShanngPlans

The Code does not prescribe limitations on early distributions
(distributions before death, disability, termination of employment, or
retirement) from general pension and profit-sharing plans as a requirement for qualified status, but the IRS has imposed this requirement in its
rulings.2 6 Such limitations would not be of consequence to a terminated
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1502(b), 111 Stat. 788, 1060-61 (1997)
(adding I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(13)(C) & 401(a)(13)(D)).
23 The restrictions m part reflect a public interest in assuring some level of
retirement savings to reduce the demand for public assistance. The government's
role in, and the function of, restrictions placed on retirement savings access is
discussed at infra notes 67-91 and accompanying text.
24 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
2 For a discussion of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 IRA amendments,
see infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
26 The Treasury regulations state that a qualified pension plan is "a plan
established and maintained by an employer primarily to provide systematically
for the payment of definitely determinable benefits to his employees over a
period of years, usually for life, after retirement." Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i)
(1976). Accordingly, in Revenue Ruling 56-693 the IRS ruled that a plan that
allowed distributions before termination of employment or termination of the
plan was mconsistent with the concept of a pension plan and was therefore not
qualified. See Rev Rul. 56-693, 1956-2 C.B. 282 (amendedby Rev. Rul. 60-323,
1960-2 C.B. 148 (plan permitting employee withdrawal of voluntary contributions before termination of employment not qualified)). See also Rev. Rul. 69277, 1969-1 C.B. 116 (plan permitting employee withdrawal of voluntary
contributions, plus accretions in value, before termination of employment not
qualified); Rev. Rul. 74-254, 1974-1 C.B. 91 (plan permitting distributions when
an employee was transferred outside the coverage area of the plan but not
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employee because termination is an acceptable occasion for a distribution.
However, the distribution is potentially subject to the general ten percent
penalty on early distributions that applies to a broad spectrum of
retirement plans. The ten percent penalty will not be nposed if the
distributions are: (1) made on or after the date on which the employee
attains age fifty-nne-and-one-half; (2) made on or after the death of the
employee or on account of the employee's disability; (3) made in a series
of substantially equal periodic payments (at least annually) over the life
of the employee or the joint lives of the employee and ins designated
beneficiary; (4) made to an employee after separation from service after
attainment of age fifty-five; or (5) made m an amount not to exceed
medical expenses or pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order.27
Notably, the ten percent penalty provisions would apply to a lump sum
to a separating employee who has not reached age fiftydistribution
five.28
Although the ten percent penalty and immediate income taxation can
pose obstacles to taking outright distributions, loans from the plan present
another option. While a qualified plan must generally prohibit the
alienation of a participant's interest, an exception is provided for certain
loans.29 First, an exemption is available if the loan: (1) is made available
to all participants on a reasonably equivalent basis; (2) is not made
available to highly compensated employees (within the meaning of
section 414(q)) in an amount greater than the amount made available to
other employees; (3) is made in accordance with specific loan provisions
in the plan; (4) bears a reasonable rate of interest; and (5) is adequately
secured.3 ° However, the exemption does not apply to loans from some
plans, notably "Keogh" plans for unincorporated businesses."1 Second,
terminated from employment not qualified).
27 See I.RC. § 72(t) (1994). Distributions are permitted m an amount not
to exceed the medical expense deduction allowable under I.R.C. § 213. See 1d.
§ 72(t)(2)(B). Distributions from an IRA did not previously qualify for this
treatment, but recent legislation has modified the rule. See znfra note 75.
2 See I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(v). On the other hand, for separating employees
who have reached age 55 but have not reached age 592 and plan to use the
distribution immediately, a rollover into an IRA can be a trap. If the distribution
is placed in the IRA, it cannot be withdrawn without penalty before age 59
unless it is taken as a lifetime annuity. See id. § 402(d)(4).
29 The loan must be exempt from tax under § 4975 of the Code. See id. §
401(a)(13)(A).
30 See id. § 4975(d)(1).
31 The language at the end of I.R.C. § 4975(d) curiously demes the
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the loan also must meet the limitations imposed by the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,32 codified in section 72 of the Code.
In that regard, the loan cannot exceed the lesser of: (a) $50,000 reduced
by the excess of the highest outstanding balance of plan loans during the
one-year period prior to the day the loan was made over the outstanding
balance of plan loans on the date the loan was made; or (b) the greater
of one-half of the present value of the nonforfeitable accrued benefit of
the employee under the plan or $10,000."3 In addition, the loan must, by
its terms, be repaid within five years, on a substantially level amortization, unless the proceeds are used to acquire a dwelling unit to be used
as the principal residence of the participant.34
B.

Indiwdual Retirement Accounts

Although IRAs are not subject to restrictions on early distributions as
a requirement for qualified plan status, they are subject to the ten percent
early distribution penalty, with certain modifications.3" Participant loans
36
are not permitted under individual retirement accounts.
exemption for loans to owner-employees, which would include a sole proprietor
and certain partners and shareholders of S corporations. See id. § 4975(d).
32 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 236(a), 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
33 See I.R.C. § 7 2 (p)(2 ) (1994).
3 See id. § 72(p)(2)(B). The IRS has issued proposed regulations that supply
a number of additional requirements, the details of which are beyond the scope
of this essay. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.72(p)-1, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,233 (1995). See
generally Kathleen A. Odle & Ronald M. Pierce, The New Regulations
Governing Qualified Plan ParticipantLoans, 26 COLO. LAW. 73 (1997)
(suggesting principal residence loan period of up to 15 years is acceptable and
refinancing generally will not qualify),
31 Several exceptions from the 10% penalty do not apply to UPAs. The
exception for distributions to employees after separation from service after
attainment of age 55, distributions for medical expenses, and qualified domestic
relations orders distributions do not apply. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(3)(A). Recent
legislation has modified the rule with respect to medical expenses. See generally
mnfra note 78. The proposed section 404 of the American Family Tax Relief Act
would significantly broaden the range of distributions for which the penalty
would not be imposed, particularly with respect to business start-up costs. See
mfra notes 110, 119-20, 122-24, 127-28, 131-32 and accompanying text. As
discussed in the text that follows, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 created
several new exceptions to the imposition of the 10% penalty.
36 See I.R.C. § 72(p)(4)(A). However, a short-term 60-day, nontaxable use
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The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 introduced a number of IRA
changes that are relevant to this discussion. First, with respect to the
"traditional" IRA that had been a feature of the Code since 1974, the ten
percent penalty for early distributions was. curtailed with respect to
distributions to purchase a home 7 or to finance higher education.3"
Notably, m both circumstances the funds can be used by family members
other than the taxpayer and still qualify for the exception. Second, a new
type of IRA, the so-called "Roth IRA," was introduced to the Code, 9
Prominent features of the Roth IRA are that all contributions are
nondeductible4 ' and "qualified" distributions (including earnings on
contributions) are nontaxable.4 ' Roth IRAs are subject to the same ten
percent early distribution penalty as the regular IRA.42
of the IRA proceeds canbe accomplishedby distributing the proceeds of the IRA
to the taxpayer, followed by a rollover of those funds to another IRA within 60
days of receipt. See id. § 402(c).
17 Under the new provision, a "qualified first-time homebuyer distribution"
is not subject to the 10% penalty for distributions m tax years beginning after
December 31, 1997 There are, of course, a number of conditions. First, the
distribution must be used to acquire the principal residence of a first-time home
buyer within 120 days of receipt of the distribution. Second, the home buyer can
be the distributee, his or her spouse, or a child, grandchild, or ancestor of the
distributee or of his or her spouse. Third, lifetime withdrawals by the distributee
for tis purpose cannot exceed $10,000. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-34, § 303(c), 111 Stat. 788 (1997) (adding I.R.C. §§ 72(t)(2) and
72(t)(8)).
38 Under the new provision, the 10% penalty does not apply if the
distribution is used for "qualified higher education expenses," which include
tuition, fees, room and board (subject to some limitations), books, supplies, and
equipment at a post-secondary educational institution. There is no other limit
imposed on the amount of the distribution, and the student can be the distributee,
Ins or her spouse, a child, or a grandchild. See id. § 203(b) (adding I.R.C. §
72(t)(7)).
9 See id. § 302(a) (adding I.R.C. § 408A).
See id. (adding I.R.C. § 408A(c)(1)).
41 See id. (adding I.R.C. § 408A(d)(1)(A)). Distributions that are not
"qualified" are penalizedby earnings on contributions being included in income.
Distributions are treated as made first from contributions. See id. (adding I.R.C.
§ 408A(d)(1)(B)). A distribution is "qualified" only if it is made at least five
years after the contribution to the Roth IRA and is made (1) on or after the date
the distributee attains age 59 2; (2) on or after the date of the death of the
participant; (3) on account of the participant's disability; or (4) as a qualified
first-time home buyer distribution. See id.
(adding I.R.C. § 408A(d)(1)(B)(2)).
42 The statute provides that "[e]xcept as provided m this section, a Roth IRA
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C. Cash or DeferredArrangements - 401(k) Plans
With respect to employee contributions to a cash or deferred
arrangement, generally referred to as a "401(k) plan,"'43 several classes
of distributions are permitted under the requirements for qualified plan
status. Imposition of the ten percent penalty is a separate matter discussed
later. Even if the ten percent penalty does not apply, the distributions are
otherwise subject to income taxation. Distributions may be made upon:
(1) separation from service, death, or disability; (2) certain plan terminations or sales of the business; (3) attainment of age fifty-nine and onehalf; or (4) hardship of the employee.' Employer contributions,
however, may not be distributed on account of hardship.4"
Eliminating the hardship exception for employer contributions was a
purposeful change enacted by Congress m the Tax Reform Act of
1986.46 "Congress believed that it was necessary to restrict the availability of hardship withdrawals under a qualified cash or deferred arrangement to ensure that the favorable tax treatment for retirement savings is
4
limited to savings that are, in fact, used to provide retirement income., 1
Congress, therefore, drew the line between employer contributions and
elective employee contributions, restricting access to employer contributions but permitting limited access to employee contributions. That
distinction makes sense in terms of providing incentives for employee
elective contributions.48
shall be treated for purposes of this title m the same manner as an individual
retirement plan." Id. (adding I.R.C. § 408A(a)). The I.R.C. § 4974(c)(4) listing
of individual retirement accounts under I.R.C. § 408(a) (wich are in turn
subjected to the 10% penalty of I.R.C. § 72(t)) would, by reason of LR.C. §
408A(a), apparently include Roth IRAs. That conclusion is supported by the
Senate Finance Committee Report, in referring to additional exceptions for the
Roth IRA from the 10% early withdrawal tax for first-time home buyers and
long-term unemployed individuals (which were deleted in the Conference
Committee). See Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1997, S.B. 949, Report 105-33, June 20, 1997, 30-32.
" See generally John Rubino, Gettingthe Most Out of Your 401(k), YOUR
MONEY, June/July 1996, at 61.
"See I.R.C. § 401(k)(2) (1994).
4 See id. § 401(k)(2)(B)(i)(IV).
46 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1116(b)(1), 100 Stat.
2085, 2454 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
47 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 99TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL

EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1986 635 (Comm. Print, 1987).
41 Otherwise, employees could be reluctant to make elective contributions
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With respect to the hardship exception to early distributions, the
401(k) regulations provide an extensive treatment of the meaning of
"hardship. 49 The general rule is that "a distribution is made on account
of hardship only if the distribution both is made on account of an
immediate and heavy financial need of the employee and is necessary to
satisfy the financial need."5 The regulations present several situations
that would be deemed "immediate and heavy financial need." These
include expenses for medical care, the purchase of a principal residence,
payment of post-secondary education expenses, and "[p]ayments
necessary to prevent the eviction of the employee from the employee's
'
principal residence or foreclosure on the mortgage on that residence."51
Financing a new business is thus not expressly included as a financial
52
need.
Even if there is a financial need, the employee must also demonstrate
that the distribution is required to meet that need - that it cannot be
satisfied by other resources that are readily available to the employee. As
the regulations illustrate, "a vacation home owned by the employee and
the employee's spouse
generally will be deemed a resource of the
3
employee." The regulations provide that a distribution is deemed
necessary to satisfy financial need if four requirements are satisfied. First,
the distribution is capped by the employee's immediate and heavy

that would be "locked up" until they near retirement age. See infra note 98.
4 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(d)(2) (1994).
50 Id. § 1.401(k)-l(d)(2)(i).
51 Id. § 1.401(k)-l(d)(2)(iv)(A).
52 Of course, if the participant were to invest most other funds m a new
business, even to the point of being on the verge of losing hIs or her personal
residence, these provisions would be invoked. Also, with respect to education
expenses that easily qualify for the hardship exception, is it less nsky for a 45year-old to go to law school, for example, and try a career as an attorney, than
it is for the same person to start a business with the knowledge and experience
that he or she already has? The case of the misguided career student aside, it is
difficult to argue that a taxpayer's retraining is a foolish use of funds otherwise, in a strict case, we condemn the taxpayer to penury, with no viable
career, biding time until he or she can tap retirement funds. In that regard, the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 permits the distribution of IRA funds for postsecondary education, free of the 10% early withdrawal penalty. However, this
provision is much broader in that it also permits the taxpayer to pay education
expenses from the IRA for his or her spouse, children, and grandchildren. See
supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(d)(2)(iii)(B).
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financial need.54 Second, the employee must have "obtained all distributions, other than hardslp distributions, and all nontaxable (at the time of
the loan) loans currently available under all plans maintained by the
employer."'5 Third, "the plan and all other plans maintained by the
employer limit the employee's elective contributions for the next taxable
year to the applicable limit under section 402(g) 6 for that year mmus
the employee's elective contributions for the year of the hardship distribution."' Fourth, "the employee is prohibited
from making elective
contributions and employee contributions to the plan and all other plans
maintained by the employer for at least twelve months after receipt of the
hardship distribution." '
Even if the plan permits a distribution, one must still contend with
the ten percent early distribution penalty The inconsistencies are apparent
and remain so after the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 Failure to "repair"
these inconsistencies is, in our view, a lost opportunity for a more
coordinated approach among the various retirement plan provisions. For
example, although a 401(k) plan may permit a distribution at any time on
account of financial hardship or separation from service, the ten percent
penalty may be imposed because the Code contains no financial hardship
exception and immunizes separations from service only after age fiftyfive.59 Conversely, while the ten percent penalty may be avoided by
accepting an annuity over one's life, the 401(k) provisions would not
permit such a distribution without separation from service.6"
Participant loans are generally treated in the same manner as general
pension and profit-sharing plan loans. There is new interest in this area,
with some banks reportedly offering credit card access to 401(k) secured
loans.6" While the IRS has yet to rule on the plan, the "concept has
already polarized the pension community" '62 Foreshadowing the
paternalistic arguments discussed below, opponents of such easy access

s See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(d)(2)(iv)(B).
5s Id.
56 The limit prescribed in the Code is $7000, subject to adjustment for costof-living increases. See I.R.C. § 402(g) (1994). For tax years beginnmg in 1995,
this limit is $9240.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(d)(2)(iv)(B).
58 Id.
59 See
60 See

supra note 28 and accompanying text.
supra note 44 and accompanying text.
61 See Rod Garcia, PractitionersDebate Virtues of Pension Plan Loan
Credit Cards, 72 TAx NoTEs 19 (1996).
62 Id.
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loans assert policy concerns. "'It's nuts!' said Ted Benna, president of
the 401(k) Association, based in Philadelphia. 'It flies in the face of
national retirement policy My biggest concern is that credit card users
6
often are not able to pay off their credit card loans."
Other commentators disagree, asserting that greater access promotes
more employee participation. "'In 401(k)s that permit loans, 78 percent
of workers contribute on average, vs. 71 percent in plans that don't allow
loans.' , In specific defense of the credit card loan, a bank credit card
manager said, similarly, "'[i]f you give [younger workers] a better
velcle that enables them to borrow and save, [that] will increase their
ability to save, and they will be more inclined to do it.' "65
D. Life InsuranceProducts
In an attempt to lend some coherence to the area of retirement
savings, Congress has extended some of these same principles, notably
the ten percent early distribution tax, to life insurance products of a
kindred nature, such as the tax deferred annuity and endowment
contract.
66
essay
this
of
scope
the
beyond
however,
are,
These topics

mH.
A.

THE PATERNALISTIC HAND

The Governmental Stake

The overall American retirement security system is often compared
to a "three-legged stool," of which Social Security is one leg, employersponsored retirement plans are a second leg, and private individual
Id.
4 Anne Willette, 401(k) Plans Gain New PopularityAs More People Tap
Savings For Cash, DENv PosT, July 7, 1996, at G5 (quoting consultant Access
Research).
65 Matt Murray & Vanessa O'Connell, Banc One to TestA CreditCardTied
to 401(k), WALL ST. 1., June 24, 1996, at A7C (quoting Karen Barrett, Banc One
trust cardmanager). "Currently, about 81% of employers with 401(k) plans allow
employees to borrow against their accounts. About a fifth of plan participants
have loans outstanding, with most borrowers being lower-paid employees." Id.
(citing survey of 267 companies by human resource consulting firm William M.
Mercer, Inc.).
66 For a discussion of the income tax treatment of life insurance product
loans and distributions, see Wayne M. Gazur, Death and Taxes: The Taxation of
AcceleratedDeathBenefitsfor the TerminallyIl, 11 VA. TAX REV 263 (1991).
63
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savings (including home equity) are the final leg. The Social Security
system is the largest and most paternalistic program, generally mandatory
for employers and employees alike. While income tax incentives for
retirement savings existed prior to 1974, in that year the federal
government assumed an even larger role in the area of employersponsored retirement savings with the enactment of ERISA 68 and
creation of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"). 69
The cost of encouraging and inplementing the private retirement
system is significant. It includes regulatory costs incurred by the
Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service, compliance and
outright benefit funding costs by private employers, 7° and the taxes not
collected (that is, subsidies) incurred by federal and state government
under the favorable treatment of retirement contributions. 7' GovernmenRetirement income sources would also include the Supplemental Security
Income program, Food Stamp program, and other public aid programs. See
generallyNancy J. Altman, The Reconciliation ofRetirement Security and Tax
Policies:A Response to Professor Graetz, 136 U. PA. L. REV 1419, 1420-21
(1988).
6' ERISA was enacted for several reasons. The legislation responded to
reported abuses of plan assets and unfair employee forfeiture schemes. See Cause
andEffect, FORBES, Oct. 1, 1975, at 21 (stating that the core of the bill's support
was the "idea of cleaning up the Teamsters"). Another goal was to expand the
coverage of employer-sponsored retirement plans. See Michael S. Sirkin, The
20th Anniversaryof the Employee RetirementIncome Security Act (1974-1994):
The 20 Year History ofERISA, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv 321, 323 (1994).
69 The PBGC was established for two major purposes: (1) to provide
participants and beneficianes certain minimal guarantees as to receipt of
benefits; and (2) to provide a mechanism for administration and distribution of
benefits if the plan is unable to pay. The PBGC resembles federal bank deposit
insurance organizations because it collects premiums from employers (excluding
plans maintained by professional service employers that have no more than 25
participants, governmental and church-sponsored plans, and defined contribution
plans) and in return, it insures that pension benefits will be paid even if the
employer becomes insolvent or is otherwise unable to fully fund its pension
liabilities. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1994).
70 In 1991 employers contributed$1 11.1 billion to pnvatepension plans. See
67

PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFrrS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.,
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN (1993), reprntedin U.S. DEP'T OF COM.,

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES 1995, No. 599, at 383.
' For 1997, the revenue cost of the exclusion from tax of pension

contributions and earnings on accumulations reached $59.49 billion for employer
plans, $6.12 billion for IRAs, and $5.195 billion for Keoghs. See U.S. OFF. OF
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tal encouragement of retirement savings is not, however, confined to
ERISA and the income tax code. For example, to protect at least some
of a debtor's nest egg from creditors, the bankruptcy law72 and some
state laws73 exempt retirement assets from the claims of creditors.
Before 1996, one could have stated that, with few exceptions, the
retirement savings provisions were not aimed at encouraging Americans
simply to save, but to save specifically for retirement.For example, until
the enactment of the Small Business Job Projection Act of 1996, the tax
statutes forced mandatory withdrawals after attaining the age of seventyand-one-half, even if the emplpyee had not retired, by inposing penalties
for a failure to do so.74 Hence, one was discouraged from letting funds

MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, reprinted
in U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995,

No. 523, at 339. To the extent that a state's income tax base is linked with
federal taxable income, state governments also forego tax revenues attributable
to retirement contributibns.
72 So-called "ERISA-qualified" plans are excluded from the bankrupt's
estate. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 760 (1992). However, not all
retirement plans enjoy that status. See generally Mary Ann Jackson, Patterson v.
Shumate: What Happens to PensionBenefits in Bankruptcy?, 47 ARK. L. REv
449, 468-75 (1994) (observing that if a plan does not meet the definition of an
employee benefit plan prescribed by ERISA, it would not be excludable from the
bankrupt's estate except under certain provisions of state spendthrift trust law or
some other "applicable nonbankruptcy law"); Jeanne Cullinan Ray, Protecting
Pension Assets in PersonalBankruptcy, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv 409, 425-26
(1994) (noting that IRAs are includable m the bankrupt's estate by case law);
Carla Michele Schiff, Note, ProtectingNon-ERISA Pension Funds From the
Reachof Creditorsin Bankruptcy, 11 BANKR. DEV J. 155 (1995) (discussing the
predicament of small business owners, sole practitioners, and other non-ERISA
pension fund holders who cannot exclude funds from their bankruptcy estate).
" See, e.g., COLO. REv STAT. ANN. §§ 13-54-102, -54-104, -54.5-101
(West 1997) (exempting non-qualified plans and Individual Retirement
Accounts). For a brief discussion of the interplay of state and federal law in this
area, see Kelly Rennan, Rights of the Debtor and Creditor to RetirementPlan
Benefits: An Update, COLO. LAW., May 1996, at 45.
4The purpose of these savings plans is not capital formation or estate
enhancement; instead, it is to fund retirement. Accordingly, I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)
requires that qualified plans generally provide that the whole interest of each
employee be distributed entirely or as an annuity with reference to a "required
beginning date" wlnch must occur no later than April 1 of the calendar year
following the calendar year in which the employee attains age 702. See I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(9) (1994). Moreover, the employee, upon tardy receipt of such benefits,
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accumulate. While a comfortable retirement was a goal of the system, a
very comfortable retirement, at the expense of the fisc, was not.
Consequently, the taxation provisions continue to dictate a number of
limitations on the size of allowable benefits and contributions.' Moreover, if a participant's benefits exceeded certain amounts during the
payment period, or the remaining accumulation exceeded certain
parameters upon the participant's death, the tax system nposed an excise
tax.76 That particular tax was swept away in the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997 77
is assessed a penalty. See id. § 4974(a). However, for years beginning after
December 31, 1996, participants in qualified plans are no longer required to
begin receiving distributions after attaining age 70V2 if they are still employed.
Tis liberalization does not apply to Individual Retirement Accounts or to five
percent owners. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-188, § 1404(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1791 (1996) (amending I.R.C. §
401(a)(9)(C) (1994)).
" For example, I.R.C. § 404(1) limits compensation that may be considered
as a base for qualified plan contributions to $150,000 (plus inflation adjustments). See I.R.C. § 404(1). I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(16) and 415 provide additional
limitations on benefits and contributions. See zd. §§ 401(a)(16), 415.
16 If the participant received distributions from all qualified plans and
IRAs
in excess of $150,000 in one year (the actual limit is the greater of $150,000 or
$112,500 adjusted for inflation; as of 1994 the inflation adjusted limit had
reached $148,500), the excess was subject to a 15% additional tax. If upon death
the balance of the retirement benefits exceeded the present value of a single life
annuity with annual payments equal to the $150,000 annual distribution
limitation, the excess was subject to a 15% additional estate tax. See id. §
4980A. Legislation in 1996 suspended the 15% excise tax on excess distributions
for distributions during years beginning after December 31, 1996, and before
January 1, 2000, but the estate tax excise remained m place. See Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1452(b), 110 Stat. 1755,
1816 (1996) (amending I.R.C. § 4980A by adding new subsection (g)). See
generally Susan E. Kuhn, Footloose and Tax-Free, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 1997, at
147 (observing that some fund holders will be able to save money by withdrawing large amounts subject to the income tax, but not the added excise tax).
" The excess distribution tax was repealed for excess distributions received
after December 31, 1996, and the excess retirement accumulation tax was
repealed for estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1996. See Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1073(c)
(repealing I.R.C. § 4980A). The Senate Finance Committee Report provides
several justifications. "The Committee believes that the limits on contributions
and benefits applicable to each type of vehicle are sufficient limits on taxdeferred savings. Additional penalties are unnecessary, and may also deter
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The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 blurred the distinctions between
classes of savings even further by eliminating the ten percent early
withdrawal penalty for IRAs on the distribution of funds to purchase a
new home or finance post-secondary education. 7' Although a home can
be considered a retirement asset and a good education a base for the
production of current income and retirement savings, these provisions
permit the purchase of homes for ancestors, children, and grandchildren
(albeit limited to an aggregate of $10,000) and the purchase of education
for children and grandchildren. Although politically expedient, these
exemptions further clutter the already complex retirement provisions of
the Code and dilute the protections for the retirement nest egg. In
contrast, although Congress actively considered the funding of entrepreneurial enterprises, it neglected to adopt any provisions that respond to
the start-up capital needs of displaced workers.
B. Defending Paternalism
The government's encouragement of the private retirement system is
based on paternalistic intentions. The existence of a private retirement
plan is itself paternalistic - employees are forced to save rather than
consume; they must accept future retirement benefits in lieu of current
cash compensation. At first blush, we would bypass the well-developed
individuals from saving. The excess accumulation and distribution taxes also
inappropriately penalize favorable investment returns." SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, REVENUE RECONCmIATiON Acr OF 1997, S. REP. No. 105-33 (1997).
78 See supranotes 37-42 and accompanying text. These types of modifications had been proposed in an endless stream of bills bearing a number of names,
including the "Super-IRA," "IRA-Plus," 'Family Savings Account," and
"American Dream Savings Account." For a history of these proposals and an
assessment, see Jane G. Gravelle, Congressional Research Service, Individual
RetirementAccounts(LRAs) andRelatedProposals,reprintedin TAX ANALYSTS,
TAx NOTEs TODAY, Mar. 29, 1995, availablein LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT
File, elec. cit. 95 TNT 61-25. In her concluding remarks, Ms. Gravelle observes
that the proposed liberalized access rules "for other purposes than retirement
dilute[ ] the focus of the provision on preparing for retirement." Id. at 14.
Nevertheless, even before the broad amendments introduced by the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
expanded the use of IRA funds by eliminating the 10% additional tax on
distributions from an IRA that are used to pay medical expenses m excess of
7.5% of adjusted gross income and to pay certamhealth insurance premiums. See
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, § 361, 110 Stat. 1936, 2071-72 (1996) (amending I.R.C. § 72(t) (1994)).
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' and focus on the more
debate over the desirability of "paternalism"79
narrowly paternalistic aspects of limitations on access to retirement assets.
The validity of the entire system, however, is brought into question by
discussions of pre-retirement access - the power to dissipate assets is the
power to destroy the system and its paternalistic intentions.
The proponents of government intervention m the private retirement
system assert that without it, Americans would not provide for their
retirement because they lack discipline 0 or suffer from short-sightedness.' On the other hand, paternalism in the retirement context has been
criticized for not allowing people to make their own mistakes and for
being easily circumvented by those determined to avoid the restrictions. 2

"' "[Paternalism] can be defined m relatively neutral terms as interference
with a person's freedom of action out of a desire to protect that person's welfare,
interests, or values (as perceived by the paternalistic actor)." Jendi B. Reiter,
Citizens or Sinners? - The Economic and PoliticalInequity of "Sin Taxes" on
Tobacco andAlcoholProducts,29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 443,451 (1996).
See also Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power,and PersonalAutonomy,33 SAN DIEGO
L. REv 1,35-36 nn.72-74 (1996) (discussing several definitions of paternalism).
For many, paternalism often has 'an unmediate negative connotation. It represents
a loss of liberty and control by the affected individual. In fact, the root of the
word itself has a male gender bias.
" "Without employer retirement plans, it is far from clear whether
individual workers will maintain the same disciplined pattern of savings
throughout their working years." Nolan, supra note 2, at 215.
" It is sometimes asserted that two such judgmental defects are shortsightedness and selfishness - a tendency to overdiscount future
consumption through a myopic failure to save and a tendency to
undervalue dependents' consumption. As such, tax subsidies for
retirement savings or for dependent care services may be justified as
attempts to maximize life-time or household satisfactions.
Peter J. Wiedenbeck, PaternalismandIncome Tax Reform, 33 U. KAN. L. REv
675, 685 (1985). "Such 'paternalism' is perhaps justified because of the
perceived inability of individuals to anticipate and accommodate their future
needs and because of the failure of Social Security to adequately replace
preretirement income." Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax TreatmentforEmployerBased Retirement Programs:Is It "Still" Viable As a Means of Increasing
Retirement Income? Should It Continue?, 49 TAX. L. REV 1, 3 (1993). See
Deborah M. Weiss, PaternalisticPensionPolicy: PsychologicalEvidence and
Economic Policy, 58 U. CHI. L. REV 1275 (1991) (attempting to reconcile
economic theory that free actors are assumed to choose the best economic course
of action with paternalistic retirement policies).
82 See Halperin, supra note 81, at 3 n.10 (summarizing the anti-paternalist
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A thoughtful discussion of the arguments supporting the forced
purchase of retirement benefits has been provided by Professor
Bankman. 3 First, effective planning might otherwise be distorted
through factual mistakes concerning future income, health and life
expectancy, inflation, and the investment rate of return, to name but a
few. 4 In that regard, a recent survey found that workers expected that
government and employers would provide sixty-three percent of their
retirement income, with individual earnings and investments producing
the balance of thirty-seven percent. Other studies show, however, that
individual earnings and investments actually account for about forty-six
percent of retirement income.85 Second, the employee may have "an
erroneous belief as to the importance of income upon retirement."86
Third, the employee may suffer from death-related anxiety, resulting m
myopic behavior."7 Fourth, while there is some evidence that employees

positions, including assertions that workers would seek employment without
forced retirement savings plans or would borrow to maintain high present
consumption). It has been argued that the paternalism reflected in the tax on
tobacco products restrains individual choice and is undemocratic. See Reiter,
supra note 79, at 451-60. To give each American power over his or her Social
Security benefits (through a type of IRA account) rejects paternalism and was the
basis of 1996 Republican presidential candidate Steve Forbes' reform proposal.
In response to the assertion that the American people cannot be trusted to invest
their own money, Forbes states, "By that standard, we shouldn't be trusted to
handle our paychecks, to choose our own leaders, to pick our own careers and
spouses." Steve Forbes, How to Replace Social Security, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
1996, at A20.While advocating permitting people to choose a retirement age
"above a certain age, say 60," Mr. Forbes states that "they could not withdraw
their money until a certain age." Id. Of course, paternalism is a difficult habit to
break, so "[tihe federal government would guarantee a mminum. safety net for
protection." Id. The debate of the level of safety in that net would be interesting.
But see Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P McCouch, PrvatizingSocial Security:
Eight Myths, 74 TAx NoTEs 1167, 1171 ("Retirement security could be
undermined if participants were permitted to make withdrawals from their
individual accounts prior to retirement or to receive lump sum distributions upon
retirement.").
83 See Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension
PlanAnti-DiscriminationProvisionsDesirable?,55 U. CFH. L. REv 790(1988).
84 See id. at 816.
85 See Workers Have Inflated Expectations of Retirement Income, Survey
Shows, 20 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, 2580 (Dec. 13, 1993).
86 Bankman, supra note 83, at 817
87 See zd. at 818.
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do not under-save, the overall evidence is not conclusive."8 Fifth,
"forced savings of individuals m their working years might plausibly
reduce the amount of support required after retirement." 9
The fifth argument, that the government encourages private retirement
savings to avert ultimate reliance on public assistance programs,
acknowledges that Social Security benefits are inadequate to meet all
retirement income needs, but also assumes that the government must or
will continue public welfare programs for the support of indigent elderly
However, with respect to the plight of poorer workers, observers note that
private retirement plans have never covered more than fifty percent of the
private work force, and lower paid workers are a disproportionate number
of those lacking coverage.90 Professor Bankman concludes that "[w]hile
there are many good arguments in favor of forced saving, none of those
arguments is without difficulty Perhaps the most that can be said is that
the cumulative weight of the arguments, considered in light of the
potential misery faced by the elderly poor, plausibly supports a regimen
of forced saving."9
The private retirement system is admittedly imperfect. It is overly
complex and displays other problems.92 Still, there have been some
See id. at 818-20.
'9 Id. at 821. Similar arguments have been made m support of tax incentives
for life insurance - that life insurance may enable the insured's family to avoid
becoming dependent on governmental assistance. See Gazur, supra note 66, at
317
90 See Halperin, supra note 81, at 5. A review of a recent book, Will
America Grow Up Before It Grows Old?, cited a shocking statistic: "Only 30%
of Amencan families save for the future at all: and even among that 30%, the
median amount saved is just $1,000. Half of all adults in their late 50s have less
than $10,000 socked away." David Frum, The Bankruptcy Around the Corner,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1996, at A18. Moreover, with respect to poorer workers,
an employer can "integrate" Social Security contributions into the overall private
retirement plan, paying more on behalf of workers whose pay exceeds the Social
Security taxable wage base, to the relative disadvantage of workers earning less
than that base. See generally Ellen E. Schultz, The Pension Eraser- "Integrating" Social Security Can Cut Benefits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1997, at Cl.
91 Bankman, supra note 83, at 821.
92 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement
Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REv 851 (1987) (arguing that a
coordinated approachto retirement security is required, including Social Security,
rather than focusing primarily on the income tax aspects). See Bankman, supra
note 83, at 834 (concluding that the anti-discrimination rules are ineffective and
counter-productive, and that a mandatory umversal pension plan should be
88
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successes, 93 and the system, in some form, should and will continue.
The primary issue for this essay,.therefore, is whether liberalizing the
restrictions on distributions can be accomplished without increasing the
ultimate demand for public assistance.
C. The LiberalizationDebate
Arguments advanced in favor of loosening the restrictions on access
to retirement savings require a degree of optimism about human nature.
According to these arguments, the availability of funds to a budding
entrepreneur can make that person's life more fulfilling and ultimately
financially secure if the enterprise is successful. That success would be
spread to other family members and to new employees of the enterprise
whose jobs might not otherwise have been created - thereby reducing
their probability of resorting to public assistance. Even if one is skeptical
of such rosy predictions, the current system imposes no penalties or
limitations whatsoever on spendthrift behavior after age fifty-five or fiftymne-and-one-half, depending on the type of retirement plan in question,
at which point many plans permit a lump-sum payout. 94 Unless one can
argue that the "follies of youth" still plague forty to forty-five-year-old
individuals but not those ten to fifteen years older, the current system
provides little added protection. Tius is particularly true when viewed in
terms of the extended life expectancies of Americans - at the age of
fifty-nine-and-one-half the participant has on average twenty to twentyfive more years to live (and, pessimistically, engage in spendthrift
behavior). 9"
studied).
3 "Indeed a study by Stanford Umversity economist John Shoven
concluded that but for employer-sponsored retirement plans, the United States
would have actually experienced net negative savings for the 1980s." James
Klein, ERISA at 20: A LookBack andA LookAhead, 66 TAX NOTES 1991, 1992
(1995). See also supra note 2, detailing the dramatic rise in the level of private
retirement plan assets.
9 See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
9 For a white male or female reaching age 59 in 1990, the remaining life
expectancy was projected as 19.7 and 23.8 years, respectively. U.S. NAT'L CTR.
reprinted in

FOR HEALTH STAT., VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,

U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNIfED STATES 1996,

Table No. 120, at 89 (116th ed. 1996) (listing life expectancies by race, sex and
age).
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Finally, one must also speak m terms of overall incentives for
retirement savings on the part of Americans. It is frequently asserted that
Americans do not save enough for retirement.9 6 Assuming Americans
might save more if they were assured of more access to those savings in
the event of hardship, then loosening the restrictions, at least with respect
to employee

contributions,97 could promote that objective.9"

The

Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997's loosening of the distribution restrictions
on IRAs apparently demonstrates a conclusion by Congress that
Americans need the perception of future flexibility as an inducement to
save for their retirement. As a result, they can now apply the funds to
other uses, such as the purchase of a home for themselves, their
ancestors, children, or grandchildren, or the purchase of post-secondary
education for themselves, their children or grandchildren, without being
subject to the ten percent early distribution penalty 99 The provisions
also imply that Congress apparently now believes that even within the
context of a retirementplan there are activities more important than
retirement needs, like buying a first home for other family members.
There is another side to the debate, born of pessiumsm, that has some
force. Borrowing for a home or a college education is a fairly simple and
predictable matter. Those events are already the subject of the 401(k)
plan hardship provisions. °° A successful entrepreneurial endeavor,
however, involves more risk and requires considerable vision and luck.
An anemic savings rate for Americans, for retirement or otherwise, has
been a frequent topic in the popular press. See, e.g., James Aley, Economic
Intelligence: Skimpy Savings, FORTUNE, Feb. 20, 1995, at 38; Mike McNamee
& Paul Magnusson, Let's Get Growing,Bus. WK., July 8, 1996, at 90; Penelope
Wang, Save 15% and Still Live It Up, MONEY, Dec. 1995, at 120.
9' The 401(k) provisions, for example, do not permit the distribution of
employer contributions on account of hardship but do permit them for employee
contributions. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
98 In the life insurance context it has been asserted that the liquidity
available through policy loans is an important factor in the acqtusition of
insurance, particularly for the less wealthy. See Gazur,supra note 66, at 319. In
discussing "tactics for attracting more people to 401(k) plans" in light of the fact
that 25% of eligible employees still do not participate in them, one commentator
reported that the availability of plan loans is an important factor. Anne Willette,
401(K) Plans Try New Ways to Entice Workers, USA TODAY, July 24, 1996, at
BI ("Employees want to get their money if they need it."). There is some
evidence suggesting that plan participation, particularly for lower paid workers,
increases with loan availability. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
10 See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
96
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In view of the sobering statistics concerning the failure rate of new
businesses,'' it is questionable whether the retirement nest egg - -in
which the government is a partner - should be made available as risk
capital. Moreover, by any measure, accessing these funds is expensive;
even if the distribution is permitted without penalty, it is still subject to
income tax (federal, state, or local) that can deplete over one-third of the
sum received.
No matter what side of the debate one favors, it should be acknowledged that even the current impediments to early distributions - current
income taxation plus a ten percent penalty °2 - are apparently not
enough of an obstacle to the use of retirement funds by determined
participants. Congress imposed the ten percent penalty out of concern that
high income taxpayers could use retirement plans more as a tax deferred
savings plan, rather than as a retirement plan.'0 3 Participants reportedly
on the rate of business failures turn upon the terminology used
to describe the failure. By some counts, business failures are limited to filed
bankruptcies or situations in which creditors were involved in the winding up of
the business. A number of failures, however, do not involve insolvency; the
busmessperson simply shutters the business after paying all of-the obligations of
the business. "Experts generally agree that 80% of all startup businesses fail
within the first five years of their existence." Bryan E. Milling, How Contractors
Can Succeed in Business By Not Failing: When Employees Start Their Own
Companies, AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING & REFRIGERATION NEWS, Apr. 29,
1996, at 5; see also Charles Bunker & Guy Fowler, Weight Gainedin the US.,
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 31, 1995, at 12 (citing U.S. Small Business
Administration report that "shows 24% of new businesses failed in their first two
years and 63% within six years"). But see Wilma Randle, New Business Owners:
101 Statistics

Who Succeeds and Why, WORKING WOMAN, Mar. 1996, at 34 (citing two

studies: one showing 70% of new businesses still running after one year and
another showing that of 3000 start-up businesses studied over a three-yearpenod,
"77% survived, 19% folded and 4% were sold.").
102 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
'0' In considering the necessity of withdrawal restrictions, [t]he absence
of withdrawal restrictions in the case of some tax-favored arrangements
allows participants in those arrangements to treat them as general
savings accounts with favorable tax features rather than as retirement
savings arrangements. Moreover, taxpayers who do not have access to
such arrangements, in effect, subsidize the general purpose savings of
those whose employers maintain plans with liberal withdrawal provisions.

Although the committee recognizes the importance of encouraging
taxpayers to save for retirement, the committee also believes that tax
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continue, however, to take distributions, paying the income tax and the
ten percent penalty "'Surpnsingly, less than 50% of those who receive
distributions from a retirement plan roll the eligible assets into an
IRA.'".. A truly pessimistic and paternalistic approach to tis issue
would impose even greater restrictions on -pre-retirement access to
retirement funds; although the ten percent penalty might be much too
benign, we are not proposing such an increase. Because the private
retirement system is not mandatory and participation is enhanced in part
by some access to those funds in emergency situations,' 0 5 stricter
withdrawal rules could reduce the level of participation. The point at
which a greater distribution penalty would create meaningful reductions
in participation, however, is a matter of conjecture. Still, recognizing that
the current system does not insure the preservation of retirement assets
as an absolute matter puts the risks that could be created by liberalizing
access through our proposals m better focus.
D. Some Guidelines
If the access rules are to be liberalized, some guidelines are suggested
by the foregoing discussion.
incentives for retirement savings are inappropriate unless the savings
generally are not diverted to nonretirement uses. One way to prevent
such diversion is to impose an additional income tax on early withdrawals from tax-favoredretirement savings arrangements.
For the same
reasons, the committee believes it is appropriate to limit the extent to
which participants may make hardslp withdrawals from a qualified
cash or deferred arrangement.
Moreover, the committee is concernedthat the present-law level of
the additional income tax appears in many instances to be an insufficient deterrent to the use of retirement funds for nonretirement
purposes, because for taxpayers whose income is taxed at a higher
marginal rate, the sanction may be neutralized by the tax-free compounding of interest after a relatively short period of time, particularly
with respect to amounts contributed to a retirement arrangement on a
before-tax basis.
S. REP. No. 99-313, at 612-13 (1986).
'0' Dom Del Prete, Retirement's New Realities: Piecing Together Your
Retirement Puzzle, FDMELrrY Focus, Spring 1997, at 7, 11 (quoting Paul
Yakoboska of the Employee Benefits Research Institute). While all of the
distributions would be subject to ordinary income tax, some could be exempt
from the additional 10% penalty due to the employee's age or the method of
payment. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(2) (1994).
"' See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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1. Plan Loans Offer Some ComparativeBenefits
As discussed earlier,0 6 the current rules permit loans against some
retirement plan assets (IRAs are an exception), but limit the loan amount
to $50,000. One could tinker with the loan provisions, increasing the limit
and requiring a showing of hardship. From the standpoint of protecting
the retirement fund, there is little difference between a loan and an
outright distribution because in the event of default the loans are
ultimately secured by the participant's plan account.10 7 On the other
hand, there could be some benefit from the discipline instilled by the
presence of an interest-bearing loan with required amortization payments,
as opposed to an unrestricted lump sum distribution.'0 8 Loans also offer
income tax benefits under the current system because they are not taxable
events; needed capital is not paid out in the form of income taxes. Also,
if an incremental change is preferred, the loan area is much more
circumscribed and would not require significant amendments to the
overall distribution rules.
Loans offer an additional advantage - if the venture is successful and
the loan is repaid, the funds are returned to the retirement plan." 9 In
comparison, the proposed American Family Tax Relief Act, one of many
"Super-IRA" proposals that preceded the ultimate enactment of the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, provided that distributions from individual
retirement plans used for "business start-up costs" would be free of both
0 However,
tax liability and the ten percent early distribution penalty 11
See supra notes 29-34 and 61-65 and accompanying text.
A difference could arise if the default occurs several years into the
venture because current law requires level amortization over five years, and m
that case some repayments could already have been made. See supra note 34.
"' This seems to be a very marginal benefit, but in the 401(k) credit card
loan debate, see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text, Howard Phillips,
former President of the American Society of Pension Actuaries, observed that
"[c]redit card companies are experts m getting the money back; employers are
"Garcia, supra note 61, at 19.
not
'0 If the loan is not repaid, it is treated as a taxable distribution. However,
the participant should be able to claim aggregate losses from the failed venture
as an offset. If access to the loan in the first place were significantly restricted,
as m our proposal at infra, notes 133-38 and accompanying text, it would be
appropriate to waive the additional 10% penalty on the deemed distribution
arising from loan defaults.
See American Family Tax Relief Act, S.2, 105th Cong. § 404 (1997)
...
(introduced on Jan. 21, 1997 by Senators Roth and Lott) [heremafterAmerican
106

107
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as a tax-free distribution, it does not provide for the return of the funds
to the retirement plan. Although the participant may be as wealthy as
before, the amount of retirement funds set aside is reduced.
2. Plan Assets Should Be Last Resort
As already embodied in the 401(k) hardship rules, any changes to the
loan or distribution rules should require a showing of circumscribed need,
such as the start-up of a viable business and that the participant has
exhausted all other potential sources of assets. As far as the requirement
of demonstrating a viable business start goes, this will be a hollow
requirement unless someone evaluates the merit of the proposal. The IRS
is not equipped for that task from a skills standpoint. Even if it were, it
is questionable whether the agency workload would permit prompt
processing of requests. The plan administrator probably would be no
better suited for the business plan evaluator role. Requiring that a
description of the proposal, if not a business plan, accompany the loan

Family Tax Relief Act]. Section 404(a) of the legislation would amend I.R.C. §
408(d) by adding a new subsection 408(d)(8) that creates a tax exemption for tax
distributions "from an individual retirement plan
to the extent the aggregate
amount of such payments and distributions does not exceed the business start-up
costs of the taxpayer for the taxable year." Id. §404(a). "Business start-up costs"
are defined as
any amount which is paid or incurred
in connection with a trade or
business with respect to which the taxpayer is a 50-percent owner, and
on or before the date which is one year after the date on which the
active conduct of such trade or business began (as determined under
section 195(c)).
Id. Perhaps demonstrating the care (or lack thereof) taken in drafting this statute,
the proposed section caption of 408(d)(5) uses the phrase "business start-up
expenses," rather than the operative term of the statute, "business start-up costs."
Inasmuch as the distribution is not taxable, the provision demes a deduction or
an increase in basis in assets acquired, to the extent the expenditure is made with
funds that otherwise would have been a taxable distribution. See id. This
provision, with its dollar-for-dollar reduction in expenses or basis, penalizes the
taxpayer in an amount greater than the foregone tax on the distribution if the
reduced expenditures would have been eligible for a tax credit, rather than a
deduction. See, e.g., I.R.C. §44 (1994) (credit for expenditures to provide access
to disabled individuals). The 10% penalty is eliminated for these withdrawals by
a conforming amendment to I.R.C. § 72(t). See Amencan Family Tax Relief Act,
§ 404(b)(2).
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application could instill some rigor, but the effect would be marginal if
there were no underwriting review with a demal of the loan request as a
possible consequence.
Some form of "certification" by private lenders or the Small Business
Administration would produce a great deal of complexity and raise the
issue of why the private sector and the Small Business Admimstration are
not ultimately better funding sources. On the other hand, we already have
noted proposals by banks for credit card loans secured by 401(k)
accounts."' While the loan processing capabilities of the banks are
thereby harnessed, the underwriting procedures may be largely perfunctory in light of the secured nature of these loans."' If private lenders
could be induced to participate in making entrepreneurial plan-secured
loans," 3 measures could be adopted to ensure that the lending institution diligently scrutinizes the loan application. This could be done by
prescribing minimum underwriting standards and procedures" 4 or by
permitting only partial security for the loan with the lending institution
assuming the risk of the loan balance." 5 Inasmuch as a participant
under current law can borrow as much as $50,000 against his or her plan
account with little restraint, small venture capital loans could be exempted
from the stringent underwriting requirements." 6
m See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
One of the authors borrowed against his 403(b) account. He had only to
complete several forms, and the loan was made within a matter of weeks. It was
never suggested that rejection was a possibility so long as the income tax rules
for the loan were followed.
"' The details would need to be worked out, but the lending institution
possibly could act as an agent of the plan administrator, processing the loan from
the plan to the participant. The interest rate charged by the plan would be
increased to provide a profit to the lending institution.
114 For example, the federal government guarantees 100% of the amount of
real estate loans made to eligible veterans by private lenders. See 38 U.S.C. §
3710(a) (1994) (guaranteeing loans for the purchase or construction of homes).
Restrictions are placed on the private lender to preclude reckless extensions of
credit. See 38 C.F.R. § 36.4337 (1995) (prescribing underwriting standards and
lender certifications for veteran's loans).
"' Under the Small Business Administration ("SBA") loan guarantee
program, for example, the SBA guarantees 90% of loans up to $155,000, and
85% of loans in excess of $155,000, up to $750,000. See COMMERCE CLEARING
HousE, INc., BusI-Ess STRATEGIES
759.2-759.39 (summarizing SBA loan
programs).
16 For example, the SBA offers special programs for loans under $50,000
("Small Loan Program") and for loans of less than $100,000 ("FA$TRAK" and
1
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In contrast, the American Family Tax Relief Act" 7 proposal is very
indulgent of new business starts. It does not require disposal of the
vacation home, the boat, the recreational vehicle, non-retirement stock
market speculations, and so forth. There is no need to miss a vacation.
Instead, the taxpayer is permitted to deplete his or her retirement assets
with impunity 118 One could speculate that without the discomfort
nposed by a last-resort rule, there is less planning and thought m
connection with the viability of the proposed venture - an easy money,
credit card mentality extended to retirement assets.
3.

Simplicity is a Virtue

The plight of displaced employees who could become successful
entrepreneurs (but for adequate capital) is a small problem m relative
terms. One potentially risks the welfare of the retirement system as a
whole in trying to accommodate their unique situation. Accordingly, any
changes should be as simple as possible, with the least amount of
disruption to the overall retirement savings scheme. The authors
acknowledge, however, that any proposal for meaningful change, no
matter how simple, comes at the price of additional administrative costs
and burdens.
Due to the absence of meaningful limits, the American Family Tax
Relief Act" 9 approach probably wins on simplicity terms if compared
with a loan underwriting approach. However, the proposed legislation
would still have created plenty of uncertainty for planners.
The pivotal definition is "business start-up costs of the taxpayer."' 2 °
"Of the taxpayer" works well for a sole proprietorship or perhaps for a
pass-through entity such as a partnership or limited liability company
But, if the business is conducted by a corporation, a separate taxable
entity, what are the costs "of the taxpayer" individually (inasmuch as it

"LowDoc" programs), which require simplified application forms and more
flexible private underwriting. See id. at %759.34-.35.
17 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
118 Admittedly, some personal assets, like the family home, are quasiretirement assets. Others, like the vacation home, boat, and recreational vehicle,
are primarily consumption. Retirement plan assets are arguably special. They
enjoy some exemptions from regular creditor and bankruptcy remedies. See supra
notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
119 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
120 American Family Tax Relief Act, supra note 110, § 404(a) (amending
I.R.C. § 408(d)).
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is basic corporate tax law that shareholders usually cannot claim expenses
that are those of the corporation)?.2 ' The American Family Tax Relief
Act further states that "business start-up costs" means
m connection with a trade or
any amount which is paid or incurred
business with respect to which the taxpayer is a 50-percent owner, and
on or before the date which is one year after the date on which the
active conduct of such trade or business began (as determined under
section 195(c))."
Perhaps the "in connection with" language saves the corporation case,
particularly since the bill later expressly elaborates on the fifty percent
owner test m the context of a corporation." The balance of the language, however, is troubling.
"Business start-up costs" are not eligible if incurred more than one
year after active conduct of the business begins.124 Apparently the intent
is to provide the first-year start-up capital, but no more. If that is the
intent, is the rule a good one? While the first year may be the roughest,
there could be other rough years ahead m which additional capital is
needed." 5 Perhaps flus is the provision's manner of creating some
limits on dissipation of funds m losing ventures, but the one-year cut-off
appears to be quite arbitrary and unrelated to the capital requirements of
the business.
The one-year cut-off, if enacted, is also a tax litigation breeder. Faced
with a one-year cut-off, most entrepreneurs would try to pack as many
costs into the first year as possible - unnecessary machinery, inventory,
pre-paid salaries, pre-paid rent, hidden cash hoards, all manner of frontloading, and so forth. That might not make business sense, and would
circumvent the apparent intent of the statute, but it would be a predictable
See generallyBoRIs I. BrrrKER & JAMES S. EusrcE, FEDERAL INCOME
5.04[l] (6th ed. 1994)
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
(discussing a shareholder's ability to deduct payments of corporate expenses).
",American Family Tax Relief Act, supra note 110, § 404(a) (amending
I.R.C. § 408(d)).
"=See zd. A 50% ownership threshold is apparently utilized to promote
closely held enterprises, as opposed to more passive portfolio investments. With
a lesser percentage ownership stake one loses a share of the potential rewards,
but one also reduces one's risk. Would 25% or some other percentage less than
50% work better?
124 See id.
125 See supra note 101 (discussing statistics on the rate of business failures).
121
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taxpayer strategy With a corporation as the business, what is "any
amount which is paid or incurred m connection with a trade or business" 9
Can the individual taxpayer claim that amounts invested m stock or debt
of the corporation within the one-year period qualify, irrespective of
whether the corporation has spent all of the proceeds?
Finally, the "business start-up costs" are paid or incurred m connection with "a trade or business." It seems that a given taxpayer can return
to the retirement plan for funds an unlimited number of times, provided
each request is for a different trade or business. First, this is unacceptable
because the retirement plan is subject to dissipation by repeated failures
of separate businesses formed by a single determined, yet unlucky or
inept, entrepreneur. Second, toward the close of the one-year cost period,
there will be great pressure placed on interpretations of whether one has
a single business (for which time is runmng out), or whether that second
location, new machine, and so forth is the start of a new, different
busMess.

26

4. Limits Do Serve a Purpose
Although one could adopt a "sink or swim" approach, in our view the
better course is to recognize that the public has some stake in avoiding
the addition to the welfare rolls of the misguided or unlucky entrepreneur.
There should be a limit on the amount that a retirement plan participant
can withdraw, assuring that something will remain there for retirement.
Of course, determining that amount is problematic.
The American Family Tax Relief Act,127 in contrast, provides no
limits on the amounts that can be withdrawn, except for the one-year
business start-up costs requirement discussed in the immediately
preceding paragraphs. Some might dismiss the importance of this lack of
limits, pointing to the fact that the provisions exempting distributions
from income tax are amendments to Code section 408 (dealing with the
taxation of IRAs) and the provisions exempting distributions from the ten
percent penalty tax are also couched in terms of"an individual retirement
plan." '28 Hence, one could argue that a taxpayer should be able to
The question of when one business ends and another begins plagued the
corporate tax law with the liquidation/remcorpomtionproblem and I.R.C. § 355
divisive reorganizations. See generally BIrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 121, at
10.08 (discussing reincorporation following liquidation), 11.04 (discussing
divisions of an integrated business for purposes of I.R.C. § 355).
127 See supra note 110.
1
See AmencanFamily Tax Relief Act, supranote 110, § 404(a) (amending
126

1997-981

TAPPING "RAINY DAY" FUNDS

freely access is or her own IRA funds for any purpose (as opposed to
an employer-funded plan), and that the potential loss of regular IRA
accounts, with $2000 annual contributions, does not pose as great a threat
to one's retirement as does tapping an employer-funded plan. We
disagree. First, no more than fifty percent of Americans are covered by
an employer-funded plan.129 The IRA may be an individual's principal
retirement asset. Second, those IRA funds were subsidized by an income
tax deduction.130 The government has a paternalistic stake, purchased
at taxpayer expense, in preserving those assets for retirement purposes.
Finally, we may not be dealing only with modest amounts of IRA funds.
Although the companon "IRA Plus" proposal does speak to rollovers of
funds from non-IRA Plus sources,' the business start-up cost provisions apparently do not. It seems that a participant could receive a lumpsum distribution from an employer-funded retirement plan, roll it over
into an IRA,'32 and then access that IRA, without limitation, under the
proposed provisions.
E.

A Modest Proposal

Based on the foregoing guidelines, we propose that the potential
capital needs of the displaced worker with entrepreneurial ambitions
could be addressed by some sinple changes to the access rules for
retirement funds. First, we would focus our efforts on the loan provisions,
not on the distributions side. We do this principally for the reasons
advanced above - added rigor, simplicity, and income tax advantages.
Second, we would adopt a different limitation for entrepreneurial loans,
eliminating the $50,000 cap' and the limitation of one-half of the

I.R.C. § 408(d)) and § 404(b) (amending I.LC. § 72(t)(2)).
129 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
130 See I.R.C. § 219 (1994) (allowing deductions for qualified retirement
contributions).
'' See American Family Tax Relief Act, supra note 110, § 403(a) (inserting
after I.R.C. §.408 a new section relating to IRA Plus Accounts).
132 See I.LC. § 402(c) (discussing rules applicable to rollovers from exempt
trusts).
133 The streamlined $50,000 loan procedure under current law would be
retained for simplicity reasons (see supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text)
and to preserve incentives for elective employee contributions (see supra note
98). However, the amount of additional loans qualifying under the entrepreneurial capital provisions would be reducedby loans outstanding under the simplified
$50,000 loan provisions.
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participant's nonforfeitable accrued benefit. We would substitute a loan
limit that would retain enough funds in the plan to maintain a certain
income level (taking into account all other plans with that employer plus
IRAs 34 ) starting at the time the employee would be eligible for Social
Security retirement benefits, and including those Social Security
benefits.'35 We reject alternatives such as liberal access to employee
contributions, as compared with employer contributions. 3 6 Third, along
the lines of the 401(k) hardship rules, the participant would need to
demonstrate exhaustion of other sources of funds. As discussed above,
pnvate lenders could perform the underwriting, the loan could be demed
if it failed to meet underwriting standards, and retirement plan assets
could not secure 100% of the loan.'37 Finally, the five-year loan
amortization rule should be amended to reflect a business development
phase, perhaps requiring no payments for two years, followed by interest
payments plus level amortization of principal over the next five
years.

38

The inclusion of IRAs is necessary because that is a significant asset for
many workers and can also represent large plan distributions rolled over from
other employer plans.
135 While the outside limit for the loan would be tied to retirement asset
levels and Social Security benefits, we would consider limiting the use of the
funds to the entrepreneurial enterprise, rather than for personal consumption. The
"business start-up costs" approach (see supra notes 120-26 and accompanying
text) with some modifications (such as eliminating the one-year period) could be
employed (with taxable income recapture at some point if ihe funds were not so
expended within a certain time frame). The taxpayer would be allowed to return
funds to the retirement plan in all cases, without penalty or tax, if he or she
found that any portion of the funds was not needed for the venture.
136 Such an approach would make little sense, except in terms of providing
a liquidity incentive (see supra note 98) for voluntary employee contributions.
Even if it is the employee's money in some sense, permitting "easy"withdrawals
arguably frustrates public policy in protecting a retirement nest egg. The
distribution would not be tied to any guiding principles, but rather to whetherthe
particularparticipant had made significant voluntary contributions. The resulting
permissible distribution would probably be either too small or too large for the
new business needs, because its calculation would be based on history and not
tied to current needs.
137 See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
138 Thins is simple, but could be too inflexible for all circumstances. A more
facts-and-circumstances approach could be adopted at the risk, however, of
additional complexity.
134
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We readily acknowledge that the requirement of a base retirement
asset level, plus the exhaustion of other funds, may create a "Catch-22"
for many Wealthier participants with other assets and investments would
be ineligible for a loan under the exhaustion test. In contrast, while the
asset exhaustion rule would not present an obstacle to less wealthy
participants, the lack of other assets could reflect fewer years of
employment at a substantial salary, which in turn would cause the base
retirement asset level to not be met. In tis regard, our proposal is
admittedly conservative - though hopefully not inrelevant.
The modifications outlined above promise to provide entrepreneurial
access to retirement savings while still protecting a miimum level of
retirement savings. When possible, the proposal seeks simplicity and
incremental, rather than wholesale, changes. Obviously there are many
details that need to be worked out, particularly the private underwriting
functions and the retirement income level that is to be protected. Indeed,
in the economics of public policy design there needs to be some analysis
of the tradeoffs involved. On the one side, successful entrepreneurial
activities would increase tax revenues and decrease reliance on social
welfare programs. On the other side, some failures will undoubtedly
occur.
CONCLUSION

As American workers continue to grapple with the changes occurring
in the workplace, there will be increasing interest in accessing retirement
savings funds. In this essay we have considered the current system and
its potential impact on access to funds for entrepreneurial endeavors.
Although the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 was enacted without the
troublesome American Family Tax Relief Act business start-up costs
provision, the 1997 tax bill demonstrates a further erosion of the
protected status of retirement funds. We propose a modest change to the
system - one that will accommodate some added entrepreneurial activity
without jeopardizing a minmum level of retirement security

